Sunday 20th March, 2005

 
Dana Seetahal
 
 
 
 
Letters
Online Community
Death Notices
 
Advertising
Classified Ads
Jobs in T&T
Contact Us
 
Archives
Privacy Policy
 
 
 

seets@carib-link.net

When a jury fails to agree

In the aftermath of the Abu Bakr conspiracy trial, several issues that arose after the failure of the jury to agree have provided food for thought and for discussion and argument across the country.

Whether or not it is on the talk shows, in a taxi, a bar, or just about any gathering, similar questions have emerged: Isn’t six a majority? Shouldn’t the judge have sent the jury to deliberate again?

Can someone “get off” because of prejudicial publicity? Is it usual to order a retrial?

Facts such as that the defendant is well known in this country, having led the attempted coup in 1990; proudly has four wives; and has been on friendly terms with various governments undoubtedly conspired to generate national interest in the case.

Last Wednesday, the jury failed to agree on a verdict on Abu Bakr’s charge of conspiracy to murder two former members of his organisation.

Majority verdict

In any trial of a non-capital matter, nine jurors sit on the case (this is as compared to offences such as murder that carry the death penalty, in which there are 12 jurors).

The law provides that in these non-capital matters, the court may accept a majority verdict, which they cannot do in capital cases.

Of course, a majority verdict cannot be taken immediately. The law requires the jury to first try to agree on a unanimous verdict. So they must deliberate, and if after three hours they fail to agree, then a majority verdict may be given.

In the Bakr matter, when the jury was sent for after the mandatory three hours, the foreman indicated they could not agree on a verdict: they were divided 6-3.

Of course, this begs the question, “isn’t this a majority verdict?”

Not under our law. An acceptable verdict is one where the minority is no more than two. Thus, a verdict of 8-1 or 7-2 may be accepted (the verdict will be that of the majority).

It is clear, then, that the judge could not accept a verdict of six of the jurors.

Further deliberations

The Jury Act permits a judge to send a jury back to deliberate, in an attempt to arrive at a verdict. In this case, the jury had clearly indicated that if given more time, they still would not agree.

Since they were divided 6-3, the question was should the judge send the jury back in order to try to reach a majority verdict of at least 7-2? The act states that if seven of the jury are not agreed on a verdict after the mandatory three hours’ retirement, “the jury may be further directed to retire.”

The judge chose not to do so, and that is within his discretion, since if he “may” direct them to retire, he also may choose not to do so.

Retrial

It is customary where a jury fails to agree on a verdict to try the defendant again, since there was no adjudication on the case.

In fact, in some cases there have even been three trials (two retrials).

The Court of Appeal has itself ordered many retrials in cases where it was found that either a defendant did not receive a fair trial, or that there was some error in law at the trial.

It is clear, then, that the ordering of a retrial is not an unusual occurrence, and happens in criminal courts on a regular basis.

The real question, though, is whether, as has been suggested, the defendant Abu Bakr may not obtain a fair trial on the retrial because of the massive publicity that surrounded the first trial and, if so, should he be tried at all.

In other words, should the proceedings be stayed?

Prejudicial

The rule is that a trial may be stayed, if it can be shown that as a result of prejudicial pre-trial publicity, an accused person cannot have a fair trial.

Thus, it is not just the fact of publicity that will make a trial unfair. It must be shown that potential jurors may have been so prejudiced by material which has been published that they cannot try the accused fairly.

I venture to say that the mere publication of the evidence in the first trial, given on the part of both the defence and the accused, is unlikely to generate such prejudice.

If a fair trial was still possible, despite the well-known fact that the accused led the abortive July 1990 coup, in the first place it seems to me that the fact that the evidence given in the trial is now known is unlikely to make a difference.

If that were so, then any person who is retried could make the same claim, since the evidence in his trial will also have been published before the second trial.

Once there is a time lapse between the two trials—some months, perhaps—the less likely is it that details of the evidence will be fresh in anyone’s mind then so as to amount to pre-determination of the case.

The overriding determination in proceeding with a second trial must be the public interest. There is no reason that one accused should be treated differently from another if a jury fails to agree.

We should all be equal in the eyes of the law.

©2004-2005 Trinidad Publishing Company Limited

Designed by: Randall Rajkumar-Maharaj · Updated daily by: Sheahan Farrell