Both sides of the House of Representatives, the popularly
elected House, have committed themselves to constitution reform
in principle.
As pointed out last week, the Opposition United National Congress
is of the view that this ought not to be a lengthy process,
implying that its swift achievement would create the environment
that would make it possible to enact crucial legislation requiring
special majorities.
Inevitably, the question of trust in the UNC's commitments
will necessarily arise.
Constitution reform is a much more complex process than the
UNC's simplistic approach would seem to suggest. The People’s
National Movement would find it enormously difficult and contrary
to its raison d'etre to engage in any process of constitution
reform which does not include full consultation with the body
politic.
This is particularly so, since many proponents of constitution
reform have been introduced into the debate concepts which
have their origin in the American presidential tradition rather
than our Westminster-style parliamentary tradition with which
our people are much more familiar.
This is why this column is of the view that context is so
critically important if the country is exploring the possibility
of making fundamental changes to its constitutional arrangements.
T&T's size, political evolution and culture are all relevant
considerations.
The suggestion has been advanced, for example, that T&T’s
prime ministers, like US presidents, should be limited by
law to two terms.Why?
Do we have such an abundance of willing talent in our small
population that the nation could afford to make talent and
competence so easily expendable?
There is the counter argument that we would be able to dispense
with corrupt, anti-democratic and/or incompetent leaders legally
and effortlessly. But our present system enables us to do
so even more swiftly.
The electorate could reject such a leader and his party at
the polls. On balance, there is no discernible benefit that
would accrue to T&T from introducing such a change.
There has also been a suggestion that T&T adopt the American
presidential system whereby the Cabinet does not sit in the
Parliament. This would amount to a complete separation of
the Executive from the Legislature.
The American system was clearly designed for a large federal
state of continental proportions. Unlike our party system
which, following our inherited British pattern, is highly
centralised, a strict party line in the American Congress
is extremely difficult.
Like the British, T&T's parties are national in scope—not
strictly true of the UNC. In contrast, “in the US the
two major parties are actually groupings of local and sectional
interests and coalitional in nature.”
In consequence, Congressional decisions may not necessarily
reflect strict party lines, since members from both parties
may vote for or against a particular measure—reflecting
pressure or sentiment in their district or state—or the
two Houses may pass conflicting versions of the same measure.
Or, yet again, when the majority in Congress also occupies
the White House, as currently obtains, the Congress denies
the president a particular measure he wants.
Two important consequences flow from these circumstances which
must not be lost on us in T&T.
The US is powerful and important enough that when disagreements
between its executive and legislative branches hinder the
Executive from undertaking any major international obligation,
the world will wait until the issue can be resolved.
The world will not wait on T&T or small states in similar
circumstances. Rather, the international community is more
likely to sanction small states for what will be considered
failure to discharge their international obligations. The
sanctions are designed to force compliance.
The other consequence is the American tradition with respect
to deadlocks on domestic issues. They hammer out agreements
through good-faith negotiations. These often involve what
the purists would call sordid political horse-trading. But
the protagonists never adopt the position that it is not their
business to make the other side look good.
Indeed, the electorate invariably makes those whom it considers
to be “do-nothing obstructionists” pay a high political
price for their recalcitrance.
What is emerging from this necessarily limited examination
is that devising constitutional arrangements that amount to
the arbitrary culling of seemingly attractive elements from
the presidential and parliamentary systems could have serious
unintended consequences, particularly for states as small
as ours.
There is much talk of prime ministerial dictatorship even
in the UK. But the growing power of the Executive under whatever
system is a reflection of the pressures of governing in the
modern world.
This has long since been recognised as pointed by two American
scholars, Gilbert Abcarian and George Masannal:
“In most of the world’s political systems, the executive
has become the focal point of political attention and leadership
for many reasons. These include expansion in governmental
activities and responsibilities, economic crises, social revolution,
tensions in the international arena, rapid means of communications,
public demands on political leadership, expert advice and
national security.
“The cumbersome and slow procedures of legislative assemblies
contribute to inefficiency in coping with the ever-increasing
demands placed upon political systems in the last half of
the twentieth century.”
If there is any validity to this observation, attempts at
hobbling the Executive may produce short-term frustration
and unpredictable popular reaction.
But it will be unlikely to reverse the underlying trend. And
this trend is not inconsistent with our cultural traditions.
As we contemplate constitution reform, let us not be precipitate.
We must make haste slowly.
To be concluded
