As the issue of constitutional reform, as expressed in the
draft constitution by the Principles of Fairness Group, continues
to attract attention, one area that must be considered is
the question of power-sharing, as opposed to the system of
winner takes all.
That is essentially a split between a consensual model of
democracy (where competing political interests hold power
in different parts of the system and negotiate with each other
to arrive at compromises), and the majoritarian model (where
only one of the competing political interests earns the right
to control the entire political system to the exclusion of
all others).
The prospect of voters having two votes (one for the executive
branch and one for the legislative branch) opens the door
to a range of possibilities that will permit new levels of
participation in the political process that did not previously
exist.
Such a change will bring with it a fundamental revision of
the way in which institutional accountability and political
competition will integrate with each other.
If one party wins a landslide victory for the presidency and
the Parliament from the two votes that each voter has, then
one can say that the electorate desired such an outcome.
However, if one party wins the presidency (on first-past-the-post)
and another party wins the House of Representatives (on first-past-the-post)
and there is no party with a majority in the Senate (on proportional
representation), then one can say that there will be true
power-sharing in the political process.
This will create a scenario in which there will have to be
consensual behaviour, to ensure outcomes with which a wide
cross-section of the society can identify.
The absence of domination in the political system will be
a major paradigm shift to which the society will have to adjust.
We have become accustomed to the prospect of a single political
party controlling the corridors of State power.
This has made political change a matter of some anxiety, regardless
of which way the pendulum of power swings.
The tools of power-sharing lie in a variety of areas as follows:
(i) the separation of the executive from the legislature by
separate voting for each branch;
(ii) the introduction of a new method of presidential consultation
that involves the Majority and Minority Leaders in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate prior to a presidential
nomination for a range of offices;
(iii) the introduction of a confirmation process by the new
Senate after the presidential consultations with Majority
and Minority Leaders in the House of Representatives and the
Senate for a nomination by the President;
(iv) the type of voting systems (first-past-the-post and proportional
representation) and the method of tallying the votes for the
new Senate will create the opportunity for power-sharing;
(v) the power of veto enjoyed by the President and the process
of dialogue between the President and the House of Representatives
and the Senate on bills over which there is disagreement.
(vi) the enhanced use of parliamentary committees of scrutiny
over executive agencies and departments.
These political formulae are designed for an executive presidency
that has been spoken about on both sides of the political
aisle.
This is one of the natural outcomes of making the shift away
from the parliamentary system to an executive presidency.
The introduction of methods of power-sharing and the shift
away from the concept of the winner takes all is a welcome
move that will allow for various interests in society to approach
the various institutions of the executive and the Parliament
to advocate their points of view.
Our society will no longer function on the basis of the will
of a single individual, but rather on the basis of the collective
wisdom of a range of elected officials and those other officials
who will be confirmed by the Senate in different parts of
the political system.
The new Senate will become a body in which all shades of political
opinion will be able to influence the outcome of crucial decisions,
ranging from the enactment of legislation to the scrutiny
of various agencies and departments and including the confirmation
of various nominees for high offices of State.
The fact that the new Senate will still be based on the principle
of nomination will not violate our constitutional history
and traditions, but its proposed new method of allocation,
on the basis of the Hare method of proportional representation,
will ensure that political parties can only nominate as many
senators as the electorate will permit them in proportion
to votes cast.
Additionally, it is being proposed by the Principles of Fairness
draft constitution that the number of senators should be equal
to the number of MPs in the House of Representatives.
The responsibilities of those MPs will be permitted a greater
opportunity to flourish, seeing that they will no longer be
under the thumb of the equivalent to a prime minister.
They will be able to make more effective representations on
behalf of their constituents without having to resign positions
in the executive in order to do so (eg the resignation of
Larry Achong as Minister of Labour in the current Manning
Cabinet in order to join the ranks of the workers in their
dispute at Atlantic LNG in Point Fortin).
This also highlights the point about not having ministers
as parliamentarians.
At the same time, Opposition MPs in our existing system also
have found that they, too, can run afoul of the leadership
of their party in some cases where the interests of the party
and the representation of constituents clash (eg Hulsie Bhaggan
and her quarrel with the leadership of the UNC over her methods
of representation for her constituents in Chaguanas in 1993).
Has the society arrived at the point where power-sharing is
a more desirable outcome than winner takes all?
This is likely to be a key area of discussion when the next
stage of activity on the draft constitution by the Principles
of Fairness group emerges.
