tfraser@tstt.net.tt

UNC makes inroads

• UNC’s electoral advance.
• The PNM’s decline.
• Non-Indos in the Executive.
• The society did not fall apart under Indo-Trini rule.

The 2000 general election was one of the two aberrations to the pattern of one-term governments which has been the major feature of the outcome of general elections between 1981 and the last election in 2002—remembering that for purposes of this review the Chambers administration of 1981-1986 is classified as a one-term government on the basis that it was an administration different from those of Williams between 1956-1981.

As indicated in the previous column in this series leading to the 2007 general election, there was great expectancy of the Panday regime of 1995, and that is once the initial fears by elements of the non-Indo Trinidadian community had been assuaged that rule by the United National Congress would not mean political, economic and cultural subordination for non-Indo Trinidad.

Much was achieved by the Panday Government in very practical terms. Over the life of the government, Panday also worked at bringing into the Executive a few non-Indo Trinidadians, even at times at the expense of UNC stalwarts. A good example of this was the appointment of Brian Kuei Tung as Minister of Finance over Trevor Sudama, one of the founders of the party, a trusted Panday collaborator and a man with claims and qualifications to the position.

When conflict within the UNC became public just before and after the 2000 elections, Sudama derisively referred to his given ministerial portfolio as Minister of Agriculture, as “Minister of bodi and pumpkin.” The unsaid feeling was instead of being Minister of Finance he was given what was perceived to be an unimportant ministerial position while an “outsider” had the prized Ministry of Finance.

Significantly, too, and a neglect that ultimately came to haunt the Panday regime, the party with its base in agriculture and which for decades advocated an agricultural policy focus for the government, did little to rehabilitate the agricultural sector, the major failure being the inability to transform Caroni 1975 Ltd either into an efficient modern organisation or to diversify the company into a broad-based food production plantation.

To compound the neglect by the UNC of agriculture and sugar, in particular, there were a couple spectacular crop failures during the Panday regime and almost complete confusion at the end when there were conflicting statements and positions within the government on what was to be done about Caroni. In the end nothing was done.

Also, towards the end of the 1995-2000 term, there were several meetings in UNC constituencies at which bitter disappointment and dissatisfaction were expressed by traditional supporters with what they considered inadequate benefit from the party being in government.

But ironically, while that expression of dissatisfaction and disharmony was brewing within the UNC support base, the UNC government (1995-2000) had begun to make inroads into non-traditional constituencies.

It was indication enough that the ethnic fears of the Indo-Trinidad in government were not coming to pass and benefits were going to the national community so that voters felt sufficiently comfortable to begin having trust in the UNC and were starting to “line up” behind the party of Caroni-Naparima.

The figures of the Elections and Boundaries Commission on the 2000 poll support that interpretation of what was happening.

First off, the UNC added two seats to its 1995 tally to give the party19 seats and the government without need for a coalition with the Tobago NAR.

Of the marginal constituencies of 1995, the UNC in 2000 took away San Fernando West and Tunapuna from the PNM and significantly increased the party’s winning share of the votes in the other marginals, St Joseph and Ortoire/Mayaro.

In the popular vote, the UNC received 307,791 compared to the 240,372 of 1995, an increase of approximately 67,000 votes; while the PNM polled 276,334 votes in 2000 compared to the 256,159 it had attracted in 1995, a mere 20,000 increase.

In percentage terms, the UNC in 2000 won 51.7 per cent, up from the 45.7 in 1995; while the PNM’s percentage slipped from 48.7 in 1995 to 46.4 in 2000.

Overall, the electorate numbered 947,689 voters in 2000, approximately 110,000 more voters than were on the EBC list of 1995. However, the participation rate stayed at 63 per cent over the two polls.

Very significantly, in hardcore PNM constituencies along the east/west corridor, the UNC, while not making seat-threatening inroads, increased its absolute numbers and percentages of the vote in 2000 compared to the 1995 figures. A few examples should make the case:

In the three Diego Martins, the UNC’s share of the vote moved up to 28, 31 and 26 per cent from the 19, 17 and 16 per cent of the 1995 poll. There were similar gains for the UNC in the two Port-of-Spain constituencies and in Toco/Manzanilla and Point Fortin while the PNM failed to make any inroads into UNC strongholds such as St Augustine, Siparia, Oropouche and Naparima. The EBC figures showed that the PNM percentage of the vote, and so too the absolute numbers, fell significantly in those UNC-controlled constituencies.

The statistical analysis, while it disturbed the uncluttered flow of the narration, illustrates the UNC’s advance in its first five years. The party encroached on PNM territory and solidified its hold on the traditional marginal constituencies while the PNM languished during its turn in opposition.

In response to the UNC’s advance, the PNM made a number of voter-padding allegations before the poll was run in December of 2000. Those allegations intensified after the fact. However, a commission of enquiry established when the PNM was installed in power failed to provide concrete supporting evidence of the claim and the several court cases occasioned by the police instituting criminal proceedings on the allegations have not been able to convict anyone for the alleged collusion between the EBC and the UNC to voter-pad.

What then were the factors that caused the UNC to be regain the government in 2000, the only genuine instance of a party being returned to office over the period under study?

Undoubtedly the Indo-Trinidadian base of the party, having for the first time gained political power, felt it was duty-bound to vote to hold on to that status.

The delivery of the UNC government of goods and services to the national population was another factor. Perhaps the greatest reason for return was the realisation that the society did not disintegrate with Indo-Trinidad in control and that Prime Minister Panday identified Afro-Trinidadians and others to be part of his government. It was an acknowledgement that there was nothing inherently wrong with Caroni-Naparima having its turn; indeed, it had to be so.

To be continued